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ABSTRACT
Metamporphic Code Generation Using LLVM
by Michael Crawford
Each instance of metamorphic software changes its internal structure, but the
function remains essentially the same. Such metamorphism has been used primarily
by malware writers as a means of evading signature-based detection. However, meta-
morphism also has potential beneficial uses in fields related to software protection.
In this research, we develop a practical framework within the LLVM compiler that
automatically generates metamorphic code, where the user has well-defined control
over the degree of morphing applied to the code. We analyze the effectiveness of
this metamorphic generator based on Hidden Markov Model (HMM) analysis, and
discover that HMMs are effective at detection up to ∼285% code added.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Software can be considered metamorphic if multiple functionally equivalent
copies exist, but these copies are structurally different. Traditionally, metamorphic
software has had malicious intent, often written by virus authors to avoid signature-
based virus detection. There are some marketable benefits to metamorphic software
however, in that it provides potential for diversity in code execution. Analogous to
genetic diversity and its resilience against disease and other vulnerabilities in nature,
metamorphic software can prevent large-scale infection of systems as it potentially
has higher “break once, break everywhere” resistance [4].
Metamorphic software is most commonly created using generators, which pro-
cess an original piece of software into multiple structurally unique copies. Meta-
morphic generators can be standalone [5], or embedded in the software [6]. When
embedded, the morphing generator morphs itself with each generation. Metamor-
phic malware is typically very challenging to detect [5]. Recent research using Hid-
den Markov Models [7, 8] and other methods [9] has had some success associating
morphed variants with their origins. Some better-known metamorphic generators
are “Mass Code Generator” (MPCGEN) [10], “Next Generation Virus Construktion
Kit” (NGVCK) [5], and “Metamorphic Permutating High-Obfuscating Reassembler”
(MetaPHOR) [6, 11].
Most morphing engines morph execution code at the assembly level. This has
the most potential for diversity as many high-level languages provide little control
over how the compiler creates processor instructions, a requirement if the goal is to
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evade signature-based detection.
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss
various software morphing techniques. In Chapter 3, we discuss the Low Level Virtual
Machine compiler (LLVM) framework. In Chapter 4, we discuss similarity detection
strategies, with an emphasis on Hidden Markov Models (HMMs). In Chapter 5, we
discuss the objective, design, and implementation of the tooling developed to perform
the research for this project. In Chapter 6, we discuss the experiments performed,
and their results. In Chapter 7, we provide our conclusion and the findings of the
project.
2
CHAPTER 2
Morphing Techniques
2.1 Insertion
One of the simplest ways to change a program is to add instructions to it, de-
pending on where and how the code is added, very little needs to be known about
the program or how it functions.
2.1.1 Inaccessible Code
When code that will never be executed is added to a program, it is considered
to be inaccessible code. Inaccessible code is easily added to an executable wherever
there are gaps between routines or at the end of execution. A caveat of inaccessible
code insertion is that it can be easily optimized out of a program, since it is never
used. Smart detection strategies can ignore inaccessible code entirely [12]. A clever
way to avoid removal of inaccessible code is to provide a conditional path to it such
that the condition will never be satisfied in actual execution.
2.1.2 Dead Code
Dead code is added code that will be executed, but the execution produces no
usable result. The most basic form of dead code is the NOP instruction. Simple forms
of dead code can be optimized out of a program, but more complex implementations
can be very difficult to remove and will ultimately have an effect on the similarity of
a morphed program with its origin program.
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2.2 Substitution
Substitution aims to replace existing instructions with functionally-equivalent
but different instructions or sets of instructions. Two simple examples are replacing
MOV R1, R2 with PUSH R1; POP R2, and replacing MOV R1, 0 with XOR R1,
R1. A more involved method of substitution replaces a complex instruction with a
set of simpler instructions [13]. As shown in Figure 1, the complex instruction movsd
can be replaced by four simpler instructions surrounded by stack operations, and in
another step the stack operations can be replaced.
Figure 1. Complex Instruction morphed into Simple Instructions [13]
2.3 Transposition
Transposition is the process of swapping execution code around such that the
output code is different in structure, but equal in function. Common transposition
techniques include Register Swap, Subroutine Permutation, and Instruction Trans-
position.
2.3.1 Register Swap
A very simple technique where the register pointed-to by an instruction operand
is switched to another register that is not currently in use. Figure 2 shows how
4
Figure 2. Register Swap [5]
register operands from the original program “a” are transformed into a new program
“b” which is functionally the same, but is not binary equivalent.
It should be noted that due to the assembly-level nature of register swapping,
implementing register swapping at the LLVM IR-level is not possible, since registers
are not defined at the IR-level. For more information about LLVM, see Chapter 3.
2.3.2 Subroutine Permutation
Subroutine Permutation takes the functions or methods of a program, and gen-
erates permutations of the ordering such that functionality remains the same, but
code structure is changed. Figure 3 shows a program with 8 subroutines and an
example resultant reordering of the initial program. Previous work using LLVM to
apply subroutine permutation has been completed with excellent results [14].
5
Figure 3. Subroutine Permutation [5]
2.3.3 Instruction Transposition
Instruction Transposition takes the idea behind Subroutine Permutation and
applies it at the basic block level. Basic blocks are sets of instructions that have one
entry point and one exit point [15], all jumps must be contained within the set of
instructions to be considered a basic block.
A Data-Dependency-Graph (DDG) can be created which represents the depen-
dencies of each instruction in the basic block. Each reordering of branches creates a
permutation of morphed output.
Figure 4 describes converting a DDG for an example basic block into some pos-
sible morphed outputs. In the example, we can see that the path to instruction 5 can
6
Figure 4. Instruction Transposition
happen before instruction 4 is executed, the opposite is also true. Other permutations
are also possible as seen in the diagram.
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CHAPTER 3
LLVM
The Low Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) software is a compiler framework de-
signed to reduce compiler code duplication across languages and architectures. It
splits the functions of a compiler into a set of modular compiler components such that
the core components can be shared and reused across different compilation schemes.
This design is beneficial since it allows future work and optimization to be done in
components that have multiple use-cases which can potentially improve code gener-
ation for any language and architecture. LLVM uses these components to convert
arbitrary high-level language code, such as C or C++, into an intermediate repre-
sentation (IR). IR lies somewhere in-between the complexity of assembly and the
simplicity of high-level languages. A diagram of LLVM is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. LLVM Compiler [2]
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3.1 LLVM Intermediate Representation (IR)
LLVM IR provides type safety, low-level operations, and the capability of repre-
senting ‘all’ high-level languages cleanly and is used throughout all phases of LLVM
compilation strategy [16]. LLVM makes creation of new languages and syntax less
cumbersome since compiler developers need only write code to convert new language
grammar into LLVM IR. Subsequently, adding architectures is easier since developers
need only write code to assemble LLVM IR into the architectures instruction code.
IR closely resembles assembly code, with the smallest unit of execution being
labeled as an Instruction [17]. A sample of Human Readable IR Bytecode is provided
in Figure 6.
3.2 LLVM Program Structure
Programs in LLVM are represented in a hierarchical container structure. The
outermost representation, the Module [18], represents the entire program [19]. Mod-
ules contain Function [20] objects, representing functions in the program. Functions
contain BasicBlock [21] objects, which represent Basic Blocks. Basic Blocks contain
Instruction [17] objects, which represent LLVM instructions in code. There is a cor-
responding Instruction implementation for all IR byte code instructions. The LLVM
container structure is shown visually in Figure 7.
3.3 LLVM Passes
To facilitate processing of LLVM IR bytecode, LLVM uses a data structure called
a “Pass”, which are typically split up into three different types [22]; Analysis, Trans-
form, and Utility. Analysis passes often perform some inspection of code, and may
store results in memory for subsequent passes to use. Transform passes modify code
9
1 define i32 @main () #0 {
2 entry:
3 %retval = alloca i32 , align 4
4 %i = alloca i32 , align 4
5 %str = alloca [13 x i8], align 1
6 store i32 0, i32* %retval
7 %0 = bitcast [13 x i8]* %str to i8*
8 call void @llvm.memcpy.p0i8.p0i8.i64(i8* %0 , i8* getelementptr ←↩
inbounds ([13 x i8]* @main.str , i32 0, i32 0), i64 13, i32 1,←↩
i1 false)
9 store i32 0, i32* %i, align 4
10 br label %for.cond
11
12 for.cond: ; preds = %for.←↩
inc , %entry
13 %1 = load i32* %i , align 4
14 %conv = sext i32 %1 to i64
15 %arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [13 x i8]* %str , i32 0, i32 ←↩
0
16 %call = call i64 @strlen(i8* %arraydecay) #4
17 %cmp = icmp ult i64 %conv , %call
18 br i1 %cmp , label %for.body , label %for.end
19
20 for.body: ; preds = %for.←↩
cond
21 %2 = load i32* %i , align 4
22 %idxprom = sext i32 %2 to i64
23 %arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds [13 x i8]* %str , i32 0, i64 ←↩
%idxprom
24 %3 = load i8* %arrayidx , align 1
25 %conv2 = sext i8 %3 to i32
26 %call3 = call i32 (i8*, ...)* @printf(i8* getelementptr inbounds ←↩
([3 x i8]* @.str , i32 0, i32 0), i32 %conv2)
27 br label %for.inc
28
29 for.inc: ; preds = %for.←↩
body
30 %4 = load i32* %i , align 4
31 %inc = add nsw i32 %4 , 1
32 store i32 %inc , i32* %i, align 4
33 br label %for.cond
34
35 for.end: ; preds = %for.←↩
cond
36 ret i32 0
37 }
Figure 6. Sample LLVM Human-Readable IR Bytecode
10
Figure 7. LLVM Container Objects [3]
in some way, and may make use of information created from a prior Analysis pass.
Utility passes are extra passes that don’t fit the Analysis/Transform model.
Passes can be written to function at different levels of the LLVM program struc-
ture. A ModulePass is applied to the program Module. A FunctionPass is applied to
the program Functions. A BasicBlockPass is applied to program BasicBlocks. Figure
8 describes program flow, applying Passes during LLVM execution.
Figure 8. LLVM High-Level Program Flow [3]
3.4 LLVM Toolchain
LLVM consists of many independent tools that collectively accomplish program
compilation and assembly. Users chain these tools together to perform the desired
functions. Tool use is performed within a command-line environment. Tools are
executed on a variety of files, described by their extensions as follows:
• Source Files - “.c”, “.cpp”
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• Human Readable IR Bytecode - “.ll”
• Binary IR Bytecode - “.bc”
• Architecture Specific Assembly - “.s”
Figure 9 displays LLVM tool flow, showing file transition during the multi-step
compilation process. Tools are described in the following subsections. Many of the
tools can also be applied by running clang (see 3.4.1).
Figure 9. LLVM Compilation Tool Flow
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3.4.1 clang
“Clang” is the C/C++ front-end for the LLVM project, it provides a gcc[23]
compatible means to compile C/C++ code into various forms. These forms include
pre-optimization LLVM IR bytecode, post-optimization LLVM IR bytecode, and na-
tive machine code [24]. As a GCC-compatible compiler, clang integrates with the
other tools in the LLVM tool suite to create fully compiled and linked executable
programs from source code. When using the -emit-llvm option, clang will output
Binary IR bytecode (.bc) if the output file has extension .bc, or a Human Readable
IR bytecode (.ll) file if the output file has extension .ll.
3.4.2 llvm-as
The LLVM assembler, “llvm-as”, reads files containing human readable IR byte-
code (.ll) and translates them into files containing Binary IR bytecode (.bc) [25]. This
tool is used to convert the output of llvm-dis or clang into Binary IR bytecode.
3.4.3 opt
The LLVM optimizer,“opt”, reads Binary IR bytecode and applies LLVM passes,
outputting the product of those passes [26].
3.4.4 llvm-dis
The LLVM disassembler, “llvm-dis”, takes Binary IR bytecode and “converts it
into human-readable LLVM assembly language” [27]. For this project, the primary
use of this program is to inspect code.
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3.4.5 llc
The LLVM static compiler, “llc”, takes Binary IR bytecode and compiles it “into
assembly language for a specified architecture” [28].
3.5 Discussion
In summary, LLVM is a capable toolkit that provides a highly modular and ex-
tensible code modification and analysis platform. The C++ Application Programmer
Interface (API) is well documented [29], and there is a wealth of information available
from other sources. The toolsuite includes a mechanism to inspect modifications us-
ing Human Readable IR bytecode, providing a means of verification and validation.
These characteristics make LLVM a good candidate for creation of a morphing engine
in the form of an LLVM Pass.
14
CHAPTER 4
Similarity Detection
4.1 Signature Detection
Signature-based detection uses a unique string of bits within a program to de-
termine if that program is the same as another. Nearly all consumer-grade virus
scanning software uses signature-based detection.
4.2 Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
A. A. Markov developed the idea of a “Markov Process” in 1907 [30]. A Markov
process consists of a set of states and probabilities that describe the transition between
those states, often represented by a state transition matrix, shown in Figure 11.
Hidden Markov Models (HMM) are useful for understanding systems that can be
represented with a Markov process, where the states of the process are not directly
observable. A HMM is trained to generate a state transition matrix using observable
states thought to be dependent in some way on the unobservable states of the hidden
Markov process.
Figure 10 visually describes an HMM, where a set of hidden state transition
probabilities (A) determines the hidden state transitions occurring in the hidden
state sequence (X). Observations (Ot) influence the observation probability matrix
(B) at hidden state (Xt).
To assist in describing the structure of HMMs, notation is listed in Table 1. A,
B, and pi are row stochastic. Equation 1 defines the values of the A matrix. Equation
2 defines the values of the B matrix. Equation 3 defines the probability of a state
15
sequence X occurring given observation states O.
Figure 10. Hidden Markov Model [1]
T = length of the observation sequence
N = number of states in the model
M = number of observation symbols
Q = {q0, q1, ..., qN−1} = distinct states of the Markov process
V = {0, 1, ...,M − 1} = set of possible observations
A = state transition probability matrix = {aij}, N ×N
B = observation probability matrix = {bj(k)}, N ×M
pi = initial state distribution, 1×N
O = (O0,O1, ...,OT−1) = observation sequence
X = (X0,X1, ...,XT−1) = hidden state sequence
λ = (A,B, pi) = hidden markov model
Table 1. HMM Notation [1]
aij = P (state qj at t+ 1 | state qi at t) (1)
bj(k) = P (observation k at t | state qj at t) (2)
P (X,O) = pix0bx0(O0)ax0,x1bx1(O1) . . . axT−2,xT−1bxT−1(OT−1) (3)
HMM’s can be used to solve 3 different problems [1]:
1. Given a model and a sequence of observations, we can determine the likelihood
of the observed sequence, P (O|λ) (see 4.2.2.1).
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2. Given a model and a sequence of observations, we can find the optimal state
sequence of the underlying Markov process, XOpt = f(O,λ) (see 4.2.2.2).
3. Given a sequence of observations, and dimensions N and M , we can generate a
model that maximizes the probability of the observed sequence (see 4.2.2.3).
4.2.1 HMM Example
A =
[ H C
H 0.7 0.3
C 0.4 0.6
]
Figure 11. State Transition Probability Matrix [1]
M. Stamp developed a straightforward example to describe HMMs [1]. In this
example, the objective is to determine if in the years before recorded history, those
years were hot or cold, dependent on the sizes of tree rings, taken from trees that
were living at the time. In this case, there is a Markov Chain with two states, Hot
and Cold, which were historically unrecorded by humans. However a correlation is
discovered between the sizes of tree rings and the temperature of the climate. We
have a set of observable states, the values of which depend on unobservable states,
an ideal case for an HMM. In this particular case, we can generate a state transition
matrix using recorded data, let’s assume that the state transition matrix for this
problem contains the data in Figure 11. We should also assume that the correlation
between temperature and tree ring sizes is provided by Figure 12, and the initial state
distribution is denoted by Figure 13.
Using the A (Figure 11), B (Figure 12), and pi (Figure 13) matrices, and the
example observation sequence in Figure 14, we can determine the most likely annual
temperature sequence by computing the probabilities (Equation 3) for all permuta-
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B =
[ S M L
H 0.1 0.4 0.5
C 0.7 0.2 0.1
]
Figure 12. Observation Probability Matrix [1]
pi =
[ H C
0.6 0.4
]
Figure 13. Initial State Distribution [1]
tions of sequences. The computed values are in Table 2. Column three of Table 2
provides normalized probabilities such that all rows sum to 1.
O = (S, M, S, L)
Figure 14. Example Observation Sequence [1]
state probability
normalized
probability
HHHH .000412 .042787
HHHC .000035 .003635
HHCH .000706 .073320
HHCC .000212 .022017
HCHH .000050 .005193
HCHC .000004 .000415
HCCH .000302 .031364
HCCC .000091 .009451
CHHH .001098 .114031
CHHC .000094 .009762
CHCH .001882 .195451
CHCC .000564 .058573
CCHH .000470 .048811
CCHC .000040 .004154
CCCH .002822 .293073
CCCC .000847 .087963
Table 2. State sequence probabilities [1]
From Table 2 we can see that the most likely state sequence is CCCH. However,
HMM’s allow us to find the sequence that maximizes the expected number of correct
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states, computed by summing the probabilities for a given state at each position in the
sequence. For example, as shown in Table 3, the HMM probability that the second
state is equal to H is 0.519576. Thus, the optimal HMM-based sequence is CHCH.
element
0 1 2 3
P (H) 0.188182 0.519576 0.228788 0.804029
P (C) 0.811818 0.480424 0.771212 0.195971
Table 3. HMM Probabilities [1]
4.2.2 HMM Training
4.2.2.1 Solving 1: Forward Algorithm
To find P (O|λ), the forward algorithm, or α-pass, is used [1]. The probability
of the partial observation up to time t, where the underlying Markov process is in
state qt at time t [1], is shown in Equation 4. Computing the values of αt(i) using
Equations 5 and 6 we can determine the αt(i) values for all t up to T −1. After which
we can determine P (O|λ) using Equation 7.
αt(i) = P (O0,O1, ...,Ot,xt = qi | λ), for {t|0 ≤ t < T} and {i|0 ≤ i < N} (4)
α0(i) = piibi(O0), for {i|0 ≤ i < N} (5)
αt(i) =
[
N−1∑
j=0
αt−1(j)aji
]
bi(Ot), for {t|1 ≤ t < T} and {i|0 ≤ i < N} (6)
P (O|λ) =
N−1∑
i=0
αT−1(i) (7)
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4.2.2.2 Solving 2: Backward Algorithm
To find XOpt, we can use the backward algorithm, or β-pass, which measures the
relevant probability after time t. Using the data from the α-pass, we compute the β
values using Equations 9 and 10. Since the αt(i) represents probability leading up to
t and βt(i) represents probability following t [1], we can deduce that the most optimal
state at time t is the state qi when these probabilities are highest, shown in Equation
13.
βt(i) = P (Ot+1,Ot+2, ...,OT−1,xt = qi | λ),
for {t|0 ≤ t < T} and {i|0 ≤ i < N}
(8)
βT−1(i) = 1, for {i|0 ≤ i < N} (9)
βt(i) =
N−1∑
j=0
aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j), for {t|T − 2 ≥ t ≥ 0} and {i|0 ≤ i < N} (10)
γt(i) = P (xt = qi|O,λ), for {t|0 ≤ t < T} and {i|0 ≤ i < N} (11)
γt(i) =
αt(i)βt(i)
P (O|λ) (12)
XOpt(t) = qi for i when γt(i) = max
0≤i<N
γt(i) (13)
4.2.2.3 Solving 3: Model Building
We can train a model from observations using a hill-climb process. First we
initialize λ = (A,B, pi) using a best guess, or in near-uniform fashion such that
pii ≈ 1/N , aij ≈ 1/N , and bj(k) ≈ 1/M , while maintaining row-stochastic nature.
Then we compute αt(i) (Equations 5, 6), βt(i) (Equations 9, 10), γt(i) (Equation 12),
and γt(i, j) (Equation 15). We can then estimate the model using Equations 16, 17,
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and 18. We hill climb this process through repetition, until P (O|λ) stops increasing.
γt(i, j) = P (xt = qi,xt+1 = qj | O,λ),
for {t|0 ≤ t < T − 1} and {i|0 ≤ i, j < N}
(14)
γt(i, j) =
αt(i)aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j)
P (O|λ) (15)
pii = γ0(i), for {i|0 ≤ i < N} (16)
aij =
T−2∑
t=0
γt(i, j)
/
T−2∑
t=0
γt (17)
bj(k) =
T−1∑
t=0Ot=k
γt(j)
/
T−1∑
t=0
γt(j) (18)
4.2.3 HMM Use Cases
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based detection uses a trained HMM to deter-
mine if a program is similar enough to another program to be considered functionally
equivalent. Research has shown that HMMs can be used to successfully detect meta-
morphic viruses [7, 8, 12, 14], and are often used in pattern recognition applications,
such as speech [31] and handwriting [32] recognition, and bioinformatics [33].
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CHAPTER 5
Objective, Design, and Implementation
5.1 Introduction
The primary objective of this research is to perform code morphing such that
the degree to which a morphing strategy is applied, is configured at run time. LLVM
is an ideal tool to use to accomplish this, given the modularity of the toolchain.
5.2 Implementation
5.2.1 LLVM BasicBlockPass
Since the objective is to morph code, a transform pass is an ideal candidate.
Morphing code requires adjustments at the Instruction level, and LLVM BasicBlocks
contain Instructions, so an LLVM BasicBlockPass is one way to accomplish our ob-
jective. A BasicBlockPass, “MorphingBasicBlockPass”, was developed in C++.
5.2.1.1 Features
Command line options are listed in Table 4. An example of execution is shown
in Figure 15, where the degree for each strategy is set to a value of 30.
Option Description Input
add-degree The probability addition is applied 0-INT MAX
sub-degree The probability substitution is attempted 0-100
trs-degree The probability transposition is attempted 0-100
Note: Probabilities are evaluated for each original Instruction
Table 4. MorphingBasicBlockPass Command-Line Options
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opt -load MorphingBasicBlockPass.so -MorphingBasicBlockPass
-add-degree 30 -sub-degree 30 -trs-degree 30 < FILE.bc >
MORPHED FILE.bc
Figure 15. Morphing Pass Command Line Example
5.2.1.2 Morphing
Morphing degree is defined by user input. For each BasicBlock, an iteration is
performed over the Instruction objects. With each iteration, a random distribution of
1 to 100 is used to select a random number for comparison with the given morphing
strategy degree. If the random number is less than or equal to the degree, this is
considered a “hit” and the morphing strategy is attempted using that Instruction.
Multiple strategies can be applied to the same instruction if more than one strategy
has a “hit”. In the case of addition, a multiplier effect is applied if the add-degree
is greater than 100, this guarantees that for each multiple of 100, an instruction is
added.
5.2.1.2.1 Addition
The code addition strategy adds dead code to the program. When a hit occurs,
a randomly selected Instruction object is created and inserted into the Instruction
object list in the BasicBlock, after the current Instruction object in iteration. A
vector of enumerations, representing instructions, is used with a randomly selected
index, bounded by the vector size, to determine the instruction to add. Possible
instructions added are shown in Table 5.
To mitigate constant folding, where the compiler pre-computes constant values at
compile time and optimizes them out, at the start of each BasicBlock, a 64-bit integer
is allocated in memory. This value is loaded into a register initially and associated
with the first dead code instruction, each subsequent dead code instruction is chained
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Enumeration Returns LLVM Instruction x86 Output
BINARY OP ADD int64 add add
BINARY OP SUB int64 sub sub
BINARY OP MUL int64 mul mul
BINARY OP DIV int64 div div
BINARY OP REM int64 urem div
BINARY OP SHL int64 shl shl
BINARY OP LSHR int64 lshr shr
BINARY OP ASHR int64 ashr sar
BINARY OP AND int64 and and
BINARY OP OR int64 or or
BINARY OP XOR int64 xor xor
ICMP TRUE int1 icmp true cmp
ICMP FALSE int1 icmp false cmp
BINARY OP FADD float fadd addsd
BINARY OP FSUB float fsub subsd
BINARY OP FMUL float fmul mulsd
BINARY OP FDIV float fdiv divsd
BINARY OP FREM float frem divsd
FCMP TRUE int1 fcmp true cmp
FCMP FALSE int1 fcmp false cmp
Table 5. Code Addition Mapping
to the previously added dead code instruction. At the end of the BasicBlock, the final
value is written back to memory, this ensures that the compiler does not optimize-out
the added code. In addition, as each dead code instruction is added, two vectors store
pointers to previously added dead code instructions, depending on the type of dead
code instruction to be added, an Integer or Floating Point value is randomly selected
from these vectors to be used as one of the instruction operands. This creates a
dependency between the added Instruction, the preceding dead code instruction, and
a randomly selected previously added instruction, which further mitigates compiler
optimization. LLVM is type aware, and will not allow operands of incorrect type to
be passed into Instructions. When the Instruction to be chained as an operand is of
the wrong type, a CastInst Instruction is added to convert the type.
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Figure 16 displays a snippet of pre-morphed Human Readable IR bytecode taken
from a simple hello world program, performing the conditional part of a for loop. Fig-
ure 17 contains a snippet of morphed Human Readable IR bytecode. The parameters
of the morphing are -add-degree=100 -sub-degree=0.
1 for.cond: ; preds = %for.←↩
inc , %entry
2 %1 = load i32* %i , align 4
3 %conv = sext i32 %1 to i64
4 %arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [13 x i8]* %str , i32 0, i32 ←↩
0
5 %call = call i64 @strlen(i8* %arraydecay) #4
6 %cmp = icmp ult i64 %conv , %call
7 br i1 %cmp , label %for.body , label %for.end
Figure 16. Pre-Morphed Human Readable IR Bytecode
1 for.cond: ; preds = %for.←↩
inc , %entry
2 %16 = alloca i64
3 %17 = load volatile i64* %16
4 %18 = ashr i64 %17 , 47
5 %19 = load i32* %i , align 4
6 %20 = sitofp i64 %18 to double
7 %21 = fadd double 0x7FE9820FC1E8470C , %20
8 %conv = sext i32 %19 to i64
9 %22 = fptosi double %21 to i64
10 %23 = ashr i64 %22 , 46
11 %arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [13 x i8]* %str , i32 0, i32 ←↩
0
12 %24 = sitofp i64 %23 to double
13 %25 = fcmp false double 0x7FC385A243682477 , %24
14 %26 = zext i1 %25 to i64
15 %call = call i64 @strlen(i8* %arraydecay) #4
16 %27 = lshr i64 %26 , 39
17 store volatile i64 %27 , i64* %16
18 %cmp = icmp ult i64 %conv , %call
19 br i1 %cmp , label %for.body , label %for.end
Figure 17. Morphed Human Readable IR Bytecode (add = 100, sub = 0)
5.2.1.2.2 Substitution
Substitution is limited to integer and floating-point add and subtract instruc-
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tions. When a hit occurs, the current instruction is evaluated to determine if it is
suitable for substitution, if not, the substitution operation is aborted. As shown in
Table 6; an “add” operation is replaced with a negate and “sub”, a “sub” operation
is replaced with a negate and “add”. LLVM does not have an IR representation for
“neg”, and instead uses subtraction against zero [16].
Input (LLVM) → Output (LLVM) → Output (x86)
O = add x y →
O′ = sub 0 x
O = sub y O′ →
sub
sub
O = fadd x y →
O′ = fsub 0 x
O = fsub y O′ →
subsd
subsd
O = sub x y →
O′ = sub 0 x
O = add O′ y →
sub
add
O = fsub x y →
O′ = fsub 0 x
O = fadd O′ y →
subsd
addsd
Table 6. Code Substitution Mapping
5.2.1.2.3 Transposition
Transposition uses the DependenceAnalysis [34] process to determine instruction
dependencies. In testing, this feature frequently returned that instructions were de-
pendent on previous instructions, and in some cases where dependencies were not
detected, inspection of the code showed that a dependence did indeed exist. Alter-
native mechanisms to leverage LLVM for dependence analysis were searched for, but
none were found. As a result, the user-input to configure transposition degree, and
the strategy activation code exists but the morphing strategy is not implemented.
5.2.1.3 Validation
Validation was performed by executing the full toolchain on pre-morphed and
morphed code. Comparisons were performed at both the LLVM IR Bytecode phase
(see Figures 16, 17), and at the post-assembled phase, by performing opcode extrac-
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tion (see 5.2.2). Figure 18 contains a section of opcodes extracted from a “hello world”
test program that was not morphed. Figure 19 contains the corresponding section of
opcodes extracted from a morphed variant of the “hello world” test program listed
above. The parameters of the morphing were -add-degree=30 -sub-degree=0. The
following LLVM instructions were added to this section as part of the morphing, line
numbers of the result listed in parenthesis: icmp false (ln. 7), lshr (ln. 12), and lshr
(ln. 20).
1 nop DWORD PTR [rax]
2 push rbp
3 mov rbp ,rsp
4 sub rsp ,0x30
5 mov DWORD PTR [rbp -0x4],0x0
6 mov rax ,QWORD PTR ds:0 x400680
7 mov QWORD PTR [rbp -0x15],rax
8 mov ecx ,DWORD PTR ds:0 x400688
9 mov DWORD PTR [rbp -0xd],ecx
10 mov dl ,BYTE PTR ds:0 x40068c
11 mov BYTE PTR [rbp -0x9],dl
12 mov DWORD PTR [rbp -0x8],0x0
13 lea rdi ,[rbp -0x15]
14 movsxd rax ,DWORD PTR [rbp -0x8]
15 mov QWORD PTR [rbp -0x20],rax
16 call 400430 <strlen@plt >
17 mov rdi ,QWORD PTR [rbp -0x20]
18 cmp rdi ,rax
19 jae 4005e1 <main+0x81 >
20 movabs rdi ,0 x40068d
21 movsxd rax ,DWORD PTR [rbp -0x8]
22 movsx esi ,BYTE PTR [rbp+rax*1-0x15]
23 mov al ,0x0
Figure 18. Pre-Morphed Extracted Opcodes
5.2.2 Opcode Extraction
Opcodes need to be extracted for two reasons; they’re required to validate what
the compiler is doing with morphed LLVM IR bytecode, and they need to be extracted
to perform similarity detection using non-morphed and morphed code. Objdump, the
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1 nop DWORD PTR [rax]
2 push rbp
3 mov rbp ,rsp
4 sub rsp ,0x50
5 movabs rax ,0 x7c2852d3e7014b1c
6 mov rcx ,QWORD PTR [rbp -0x8]
7 cmp rax ,rcx
8 setne dl
9 and dl ,0x1
10 movzx esi ,dl
11 mov eax ,esi
12 shr rax ,0x28
13 mov DWORD PTR [rbp -0xc],0x0
14 mov rcx ,QWORD PTR ds:0 x4007b0
15 mov QWORD PTR [rbp -0x1d],rcx
16 mov esi ,DWORD PTR ds:0 x4007b8
17 mov DWORD PTR [rbp -0x15],esi
18 mov dl ,BYTE PTR ds:0 x4007bc
19 mov BYTE PTR [rbp -0x11],dl
20 shr rax ,0x1f
21 mov QWORD PTR [rbp -0x8],rax
22 mov DWORD PTR [rbp -0x10],0x0
23 lea rdi ,[rbp -0x1d]
24 mov rax ,rsp
25 add rax ,0 xfffffffffffffff0
26 mov rsp ,rax
27 mov rax ,QWORD PTR [rax]
28 movsxd rcx ,DWORD PTR [rbp -0x10]
29 mov QWORD PTR [rbp -0x28],rcx
30 mov QWORD PTR [rbp -0x30],rax
31 call 4004f0 <strlen@plt >
32 mov rcx ,QWORD PTR [rbp -0x28]
33 cmp rcx ,rax
34 jae 4006fd <main+0xdd >
35 movabs rdi ,0 x4007bd
36 mov rax ,rsp
37 add rax ,0 xfffffffffffffff0
38 mov rsp ,rax
39 mov rax ,QWORD PTR [rax]
40 movsxd rcx ,DWORD PTR [rbp -0x10]
41 movsx esi ,BYTE PTR [rbp+rcx*1-0x1d]
42 mov QWORD PTR [rbp -0x38],rax
43 mov al ,0x0
Figure 19. Morphed Extracted Opcodes (add = 30, sub & trs = 0)
tool chosen for this research, is part of the Linux GNU binutils [35] package. Opcodes
are extracted using the Intel standard assembly syntax [36], text output is parsed
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using grep [37] and awk [38]. For similarity detection, opcodes go through a cleanup
process, a simple program, “filteropcodes” was developed in C++. Filteropcodes
compares each value of a potential opcode with a file containing 697 valid opcodes,
taken as input, and filters out invalid entries, removing non-code data leftover from
the initial parsing phase. The valid opcode mnemonics were retrieved from an XML
file [39] using an XSL stylesheet. An example command-line execution of the opcode
extraction process is shown in Figure 20.
objdump -M x86_64 ,intel -mnemonic --no -show -raw -insn -S $BINARY |
grep ’ [0-9a-zA -Z]*\:’ | awk ’!($1="")’ | awk ’{print $1}’ >
$PREFILTERED_OPCODES
filteropcodes $VALID_INSTRUCTIONS $PREFILTERED_OPCODES
$FILTERED_OPCODES
Figure 20. Objdump Execution Example
5.2.3 Similarity Detector (HMM)
An HMM implementation was written in C++. Two programs were developed, a
HMM building program “hmm” that trains an HMM from input data, and an HMM
scoring program “hmmscore”, that uses a model to score input data. The programs
leverage an “OTHER” observation, that captures any input that is not present in the
set of observation states in the model.
5.2.3.1 Observation State Selection
Since computational demand increases as the HMM matrices increase in size,
the set of Observation states was bounded at a size of 26. To determine the most
useful instructions to include, objdump was executed on all morphed variants of the
program. Opcodes were counted, and the top 25 most frequent opcodes were selected
for the model. The 26th opcode is the “OTHER” observation listed in Section 5.2.3.
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5.2.3.2 Validation
The “hmm” program was validated by performing the “not-so-simple example”
in [1], using the “Brown Corpus” and an HMM with two hidden states to separate
between vowels and consonants in English language. Program output that has the
expected result is shown in Figure 21.
Figure 21. HMM Program Validation
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CHAPTER 6
Experiments
6.1 Dataset
Data was generated from GNU coreutils [40], a suite of Linux commands. The
largest command, “ls”, was selected as a program to perform morphing on. The other
commands were used as the benign data set. The benign data was compiled using
optimization level 2 (-O2).
6.1.1 Training Data
Training data was generated using an Add Degree of 1, the binaries were compiled
using clang with a compiler optimization of 0 (-O0). 50 variant files were generated,
with an average of 2.06% code morphing. The variant files were concatenated to-
gether, and the concatenated file was used as the input for HMM training. The
model is shown in Table 7.
6.1.2 Test Data
Test data was generated using varying add-degree values: 25, 50, 100, 200, 400,
800, 1600, and 3200. This non-linear approach was chosen because a non-linear rate of
change in scoring was observed during initial trial and error. The test data binaries
were compiled using clang with a compiler optimization of 0 (-O0). 50 files were
generated for each add-degree.
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pi 0.0000000000000000000 1.0000000000000000000
A
0.8637300479230411998 0.1362699520770013772
0.0860074392855465775 0.9139925607138835728
B
OTHER 0.0699936581903331939 0.0082915228540217534
add 0.0014958661667065841 0.0727099056793662213
and 0.0189049567728136435 0.0127566754956268645
call 0.0323666911830608126 0.0693702185449694003
cmp 0.1366788506795023339 0.0000000000000000000
ja 0.0027361093554276713 0.0023912945970399435
jae 0.0139133354969235481 0.0000000000000000000
je 0.0701424017120766408 0.0000000000000000000
jge 0.0066208286157774122 0.0000000000000000000
jmp 0.1332991576448592508 0.0340140401570356993
jne 0.0678759673366467475 0.0000000000000000000
lea 0.0006118131491648823 0.0108553295640027355
mov 0.3259771411192445290 0.6273424358217389862
movss 0.0113590390077642038 0.0000000000000000000
movsx 0.0148211450127546766 0.0015781868146700286
movsxd 0.0028243810806406516 0.0065603714315576973
movzx 0.0061572871657375816 0.0089080851421619849
nop 0.0000000000000000000 0.0159047351172595733
or 0.0027514345427740879 0.0017130199723750384
pop 0.0000000000000000000 0.0258077976653301178
push 0.0107248596738458608 0.0262407658962855901
retn 0.0000000000000000000 0.0244669598178846558
shl 0.0000000000000000000 0.0036337069036462360
sub 0.0070663228602007655 0.0350336106545953083
test 0.0451310221905035919 0.0000000000000000000
xor 0.0185477310435632516 0.0124213378703803973
Table 7. Trained HMM Model
6.2 Experimental Method
Using the model generated from the training data, the “benign” coreutils data,
and the morphed test data, HMM scores were computed. Results are in the following
section.
6.3 Results
Figure 22 displays HMM scores for each data point across the different morphing
degrees. Blue triangles reflect the Training Data, green triangles reflect the Benign
Data, and the data points of various shapes following a gradient from black to red
32
represent the morphed variants. We can see that around add-degree of 400, the
morphed code becomes indistinguishable from the benign data.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
−3
−2.8
−2.6
−2.4
−2.2
−2
−1.8
Number of Files
H
M
M
S
co
re
Training Benign Morph 25 Morph 50 Morph 100
Morph 200 Morph 400 Morph 800 Morph 1600 Morph 3200
Figure 22. HMM Score Vs. Morphing Degree
Table 8 provides the percentage of dead code added to a file for each morphing
degree, calculated by subtracting the size of the original executable from the size of
the morphed variant, and dividing the result by the size of the original executable.
An add-degree of 400 causes a 433.38% increase in executable size.
Figure 23 displays Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for Add De-
gree’s 200, 400, 800, and 1600. We can see from the charts that the HMM begins to
break down at Add Degree 400, and continues to get worse as the code increases in
morphing.
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Add Degree Code Added (%)
25 41.86
50 84.36
100 191.54
200 285.14
400 433.38
800 671.82
1600 1,051.45
3200 1,672.49
Table 8. Add Degree vs. Code Added
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Figure 23. ROC Curves for Add Degrees 200, 400, 800, and 1600
The Area Under the Curve (AUC) for the data is shown in Table 9, we can
see that the number of false positives does not increase between 1600 and 3200 Add
Degree, which is suggestive that the HMM score plateaus at very high levels of mor-
phing. This is expected, since the HMM score is a value normalized by the number
of opcodes in the program.
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Add Degree AUC
25 1.000
50 1.000
100 1.000
200 1.000
400 0.8364
800 0.5912
1600 0.5400
3200 0.5400
Table 9. ROC AUC Statistics for Add Strategy
Unexpectedly, the Add Degree 25 and Add Degree 50 sets appear to score better
than the original training data. Reviewing Figure 22, we can see the non-linear
fashion in which scores improve relative to code added. At very high Add Degrees,
the score improves very little, and it takes a significant increase, 433.38%, in program
size to evade HMM detection. Additional datasets were evaluated and are provided
in Appendix A. These include scoring optimized morphed variants using a model
trained with non-optimized data (see A.1), scoring non-optimized variants using a
model trained with optimized data (see A.2), and scoring optimized variants using a
model trained with optimized data (see A.3).
In summary, the HMM is highly effective at determining the similarity of the
morphed program when compiler optimization 0 is used during compilation. The
HMM was fully successful in differentiating the benign data from morphed variants
up to Add Degree 200. At Add Degree 400 the HMM started to provide similar scores
to that of the benign data.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
In this project, we investigated a new approach using the LLVM Pass API to
generate highly random morphed variants of software. Dead code was added at vari-
ous degrees and a model was trained using an HMM to determine both the strength
of this morphing approach, and the strength of the HMM. Leveraging a custom de-
veloped BasicBlocksPass, we intertwined dead code within the very low levels of a
program in an attempt to defeat compiler optimization, such that the dead code was
preserved.
We discovered that HMM’s are an effective detection mechanism in regards to
software that is morphed using this approach. We also discovered that at very high
morphing rates, the HMM becomes less effective at properly classifying the origin
of the morphed program. In the case tested, the HMM was capable of properly
classifying the morphed program up until 433% of dead code was added.
There are many improvements that can be made to this code generator. These in-
clude incorporating instruction transposition using LLVM’s Dependence Analysis ca-
pability (an original goal of this project), adding new instruction substitution schemes,
and increasing the precision of dead code insertion.
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APPENDIX
Additional Datasets
A.1 Dataset 2: O0 Training, O2 Morphed
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
−3
−2.8
−2.6
−2.4
−2.2
−2
Number of Files
H
M
M
S
co
re
Training Benign Morph 25 Morph 50 Morph 100
Morph 200 Morph 400 Morph 800 Morph 1600 Morph 3200
Figure A.24. Dataset 2: HMM Score Vs. Morphing Degree
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Add Degree Code Added (%)
25 -8.5
50 13.05
100 55.96
200 72.49
400 95.58
800 133.43
1600 193.29
3200 284.59
Table A.10. Dataset 2: Add Degree vs. Code Added
A.2 Dataset 3: O2 Training, O0 Morphed
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Figure A.25. Dataset 3: HMM Score Vs. Morphing Degree
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Add Degree Code Added (%)
25 114.63
50 178.38
100 339.34
200 479.93
400 703.07
800 1,058.79
1600 1,633.49
3200 2,582.34
Table A.11. Dataset 3: Add Degree vs. Code Added
A.3 Dataset 4: O2 Training, O2 Morphed
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Figure A.26. Dataset 4: HMM Score Vs. Morphing Degree
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Add Degree Code Added (%)
25 37.65
50 69.95
100 135.35
200 159.44
400 193.83
800 251.00
1600 343.37
3200 481.42
Table A.12. Dataset 4: Add Degree vs. Code Added
A.4 Dataset 5: O2 Trained Model Investigation
Comparing the scores of the O2 training data and the scores of 1,931 benign files
from /usr/bin in a CentOS 7.4 Operating System, we can see that this model is not
producing a very useful capability of differentiating morphed data from unmorphed
data when compiler optimization is used. Figure A.27 displays the scores of the
benign files against the training data. When using a model with Add Degree 30 for
the training data, shown in Figure A.28, the scoring against the benign data is much
better, though there are still many benign files that might be considered a match.
When testing this higher degree model against the original Add Degree 1 training
data, the HMM is unable to differentiate it from many benign programs in terms
of similarity. This is a crude analysis, and doesn’t take into account the underlying
functionality of these benign files, which may be similar enough in function to be
considered a match.
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Figure A.27. Dataset 5: Training Score Vs. /usr/bin Benign Files
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Figure A.28. Dataset 5: Training Score (Model a30) Vs. /usr/bin Benign Files,
a1-O2 morphed ls
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